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Abstract
As they increasingly embrace neo-liberal economic policies (especially since the
1997–8 Asian financial crisis), the Northeast Asian NICs of South Korea and
Taiwan are now said to be losing their uniqueness as alternative capitalistmodels.
Central to the neo-liberal project is labour flexibility. This entails the reform
of employment legislation and of the wider social settlement between state,
business and labour. This article will argue against the ‘homogenization’ thesis
by revealing the distinctive political, economic and ideological characteristics
that distinguish the recent market-oriented labour reforms in South Korea and
Taiwan from neo-liberal transitions elsewhere. The sources of variation in the
pathways of labour market reform within the Northeast Asian NICs will also be
explained.
Neo-liberal globalization is said to have homogenizing effects on
formerly regionally specific capitalist forms. Long depicted as an
alternative model of capitalist development, the Northeast Asian
NICs of South Korea and Taiwan are now said to be losing their
uniqueness as they embrace neo-liberal economic policies, a transition
hastened by the 1997–8 Asian financial crisis. A crucial component
of the transition to neo-liberalism is the creation of flexible labour
forces. This entails the reform of institutional relationships that
govern flexibility, namely, the regulations specified in employment
legislation and the wider state-business-labour arrangements or social
settlements underpinning those rules. From the perspective of recent
labour reforms in South Korea (hereinafter Korea) and Taiwan,
this article will question the ‘homogenization’ thesis. It will do
so by revealing the distinctive political, economic and ideological
characteristics that mark out the recent market-oriented labour
reforms in Northeast Asia from neo-liberal transitions elsewhere.
Having established the continuing distinctiveness of the Northeast
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Asian pattern from capitalisms elsewhere, the variations between
Korea and Taiwan will be explained.
Labour has been chosen not only because of its significance to
neo-liberal transitions but also because it is a relatively neglected
subject in the comparative political economy literature on East Asia.
Such literature has focused on the workings of the state-business
relationship. This reflected the subordination of labour at the hands of
the developmental state during the years of authoritarian rule as well
as the popularity of state-centric analyses that permeated political
science. Labour has emerged as an autonomous political actor since
democratization. The upsurge of strikes following democratization
brought labour issues to scholarly attention, especially in the case
of Korea. Even so, studies have tended to be country-specific
and comparative studies of labour in post-authoritarian Korea and
Taiwan1 remain few and far between.
Labour and Neo-Liberal Globalization in Northeast Asia
Neo-liberal globalization is commonly said to encompass the following
features. First, production processes are transnationalized. Second,
financial liberalization and communications technology facilitate high
mobility of capital flows (especially short term speculative flows)
mediated through the leading financial centres. Third, trade and
investment flows are promoted through the creation of international
regimes by national governments, Fourth, liberal capitalism is widely
accepted as the only viable political economic form. The significance
of these features (especially for the nation-state) has generated a vast
and contentious literature.2
While the ever growing traffic of cross-national transactions and
international trade rules render obsolete many traditional forms of
1 For example, see Chang-Ling Huang, ‘State Corporatism in Question: Labour
Control in South Korea and Taiwan’, Chinese Political Science Review (1997), pp. 25–
48, and Chang-Ling Huang, ‘Learning the New Game: Labour Politics in the Newly
Democratized South Korea and Taiwan’, paper presented at the Annual Meeting of
the American Political Science Association (31 August–3 September 2000).
2 For a strong version of the globalization thesis, see Kenichi Ohmae, The Evolving
Global Economy: Making Sense of the New World Order (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
Business Review Books, 1995). For the counter view see: Linda Weiss, The Myth of
the Powerless State (Oxford: Blackwell 1998); Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson,
Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance
(Oxford: Polity 2000).
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government intervention, national governments continue to be highly
influential from theway they shape the local institutional environment
by the setting and enforcing of rules. Given that it has become the only
immobile factor of production, government and its administration of
rules has paradoxically become more important than ever. National
economic competitiveness in the era of globalization is arguably
defined by the capacity of national governments to set institutional
conditions that facilitate domestic competition and attract capital
inflows.3 One such condition is the legal and social framework of labour
regulations.
Studies of the advanced economies associate neo-liberal globali-
zation with job insecurity and other destabilizing changes for labour.4
Insecurity arises from exposure to world-wide competition and the
ease with which productive facilities can be transferred to more
competitive locations. To prevent local capital from taking flight
and to attract transnational corporation (TNC) investment, govern-
ments reform employment frameworks in ways that are conducive
to the ‘flexible’ deployment of labour. Seen as burdens on competi-
tiveness, the social-democratic arrangements that previously gave
some influence to labour over policy are terminated.5 ‘Flexible’
industrial workforces have some distinctive characteristics. The
profile of the workforce changes as the proportion of workers with
temporary and part-time status increases. The notion of permanent
employment becomes a thing of the past given the ease of investment
relocation. In remuneration, performance displaces seniority as the
determining criterion. In the work process, labour switches towards
the performance of multiple tasks while the intensity of work (and
remuneration) is varied according to market conditions.
3 A vast literature exists here. For standard works see: Douglass C. North,
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1990) (interaction between formal/informal rules and economic
performance); Michael Porter, The Competitive Advantages of Nations (New York: Free
Press, 1990) (institutional conditions for national competitiveness); John Stopford
and Susan Strange, Rival States, Rival Firms (New York: Cambridge University Press
1991) (national competition for transnational investment).
4 For example, see Richard Locke, Thomas Kochan and Michael Piore,
‘Reconceptualizing Comparative Industrial Relations: Lessions from International
Research’, International Labour Review, 134, 2 (1995), pp. 139–61.
5 On the increasing strain on societal corporatism, see for example, Peter Swenson,
Fair Shares: Union, Pay and Politics in Sweden and Germany (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1989).
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Labour unions are forced onto the defensive by neo-liberal globali-
zation. Strikes lose their effectiveness under conditions in which
business can easily relocate to find competitive workforces elsewhere.
Labour unions lack the transnational solidarity commensurate with
capital’s mobility. Employment casualization and pay competition
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Figure 1. Labour Reform and Its Political-Economic Context in Korea and Taiwan
Since Democratization (key turning points indicated in bold type).
within the workplace also dilute labour solidarity. Instead of seeking
economic and political advance, the labour unions under neo-liberal
globalization are confined to the pursuit of more modest objectives
of maintaining their organizational strength and resisting further
encroachments on their rights at work. Where it was once seen as
an economic partner to business under social-democratic regimes,
organized labour is cast as a market ‘rigidity’ under neo-liberalism.
The course of labour reform in post-authoritarianKorea andTaiwan
is summarized in Figure 1. Korea and Taiwan since democratization
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exhibit similarities in the course of political and economic develop-
ment. In both countries, new democratic governments (with strong
authoritarian lineages) pursued policies of economic liberalization
while seeking to expand their political support coalitions. Three key
turning points in the opportunities and constraints facing labour can
be identified: democratic transition in the late 1980s; the turn towards
accelerated liberalization from 1996; and the alternation of power to
parties historically sympathetic to the labour cause.
The Northeast Asian Pathway of Labour Transition
Historically, transitions to neo-liberal models of labourmarket reform
have tended to occur against backgrounds of organized labour
weakness resulting from economic crisis and political deactivation.
The turn towards labour reform on market principles in Korea
and Taiwan differed from the typical pattern associated with neo-
liberalism in three crucial respects. First, it occurred against a
background of mobilization and the strengthening of independent
labour organizations rather than their deactivation. Second, in spite
of the concerns about the negative impact of labour unions on
competitiveness, the empowerment of labour coincided with the
maintenance of impressive growth rates through most of the 1990s.
Third, support for neo-liberalization was restrained and selective at
both the elite and mass levels. Northeast Asia’s divergence from the
typical pathways of neo-liberalization in the developing world can be
explained in terms of these three variables (summarized in Figure 2
below), to which we now turn.
Labour and the Political Environment
Labour control under neo-liberalism is based on the employer’s
freedom to hire and fire. The role of labour union influence on
the setting of wages and conditions depends on the extent of neo-
liberalization. Chile under Pinochet (1973–90) was perhaps the most
extrememanifestation of neo-liberalization. Denied collective support
because their organizations were violently dismantled, workers were
literally ‘atomized’ by the marketization strategy.6 By achieving very
6 Paul W. Drake, Labor Movements and Dictatorship: The Southern Cone in Comparative
Perspective (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), pp. 31–3.
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Figure 2. Pathways to the Marketization of Labour Relations.
flexible labour markets, labour control in authoritarian Korea and
Taiwan approximated the neo-liberal ideal, but in its use of producer
organizations for the purposes of manipulation and mobilization, it
also resembled the corporatist project. The flexible labour markets
of Korea and Taiwan also existed in economic contexts that were
highly statist (see below). Moreover, ‘flexibility’ existed not because
the labour market was deregulated, but because the state allowed
business to flout protective regulations.
It is widely acknowledged that Korea and Taiwan represent exemp-
lars of gradualism in democratization and economic liberalization.
Democratic breakthroughs in both countries occurred in 1987. Korea
made a transition to free elections in the space of a year whereas
Taiwan did not complete the process until 1996. Democratization
in the late 1980s ushered in a period of labour activation, and
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transformed the conditions under which the later labour market
reforms would take place. This is evident from the trends in Tables 1
and 2 showing the escalation in the incidence of labour disputes,
workers involved and workdays lost. The economic impact of labour
activation is also evident from the upward trend in unit labour costs in
the years immediately following democratization (Table 4). Numbers
do not tell the whole story. In the case of Taiwan for example,
commentators noticed that disputes took on intensive, confrontational
characteristics not previously witnessed. Not only did more labour
disputes turn into actual strikes, there was an escalation of illegal
actions, and labour unions became pro-active inmaking demands from
employers.7 Labour protest was one expression of the rising tide of
social dissatisfaction. That governments became more responsive to
discontent after democratization could be seen from the growth of the
social component of public expenditures (Table5) and redistributional
initiatives, and the introduction of new protective labour laws and the
amendments of old ones (Figure 1).
Korean labour protest peaked in 1987 (the year of the so-called
Great Workers’ Struggle). Although the incidence of protests and
numbers of workers involved declined significantly thereafter, working
days lost (perhaps the clearest indicator of strike action) remained
a serious problem for Korean industry (e.g. the post-1987 low of
393,000 days compared with the pre-1987 high of 72,000 days in
1985). In Taiwan, democratization was followed by a new peaks in
disputes (number of cases, workers involved and workdays lost) in
1989. The incidence of disputes and workers involved fell during
1990–2 but escalated thereafter and reached new peaks in 1995
(numbers of workdays lost), 1998 (total workers involved) and 1999
(total cases of disputes). It is noticeable that the average labour dispute
in Taiwan was much smaller than in Korea (workers per dispute).
Another interesting comparison is the proportionate amount of lost
worktime that reveal a far more serious problem of disruption by
labour militancy for Korea. For example, the peak year for work days
lost in Taiwan was 1995 (46,926 days in an employed population of
9million) while the same year represented the lowest year for workdays
7 Archie Kleingartner and Hsueh-Yu Peng (1991) ‘Taiwan: An Exploration of
Labour Relations in Transition’, British Journal of Industrial Relations 29, 3, September
(1991), pp. 427–45 at pp. 436–8; Michael Hsin-Huang Hsiao, ‘The Labor Movement
in Taiwan: A Retrospective and Prospective Look’, in Denis Fred Simon and Michael
Y.M. Kau, eds, Taiwan: Beyond the Economic Miracle (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1992),
pp. 151–67.
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Table 1
Labour Disputes in Korea 1975–1999
Dispute Causes
Total Workers Workers Working Unfair Better
disputes involved per dispute days lost Wage Delayed Labour Labour
(cases) (1,000s) (persons) (1,000s) Bargaining wages practice conditions Others
1980 407 49 120 62 38 287 – 14 68
1981 186 35 188 31 38 69 4 32 43
1982 88 9 102 12 7 26 – 21 34
1983 98 11 112 9 8 35 – 19 36
1984 113 16 142 20 29 39 7 14 24
1985 265 29 109 64 84 61 12 47 61
1986 276 47 170 72 75 48 16 48 89
1987 3,749 1,262 337 6,947 2,613 45 65 566 460
1988 1,873 293 156 5,401 946 59 59 136 673
1989 1,616 409 253 6,351 742 59 10 21 784
1990 322 134 416 4,487 167 10 – 2 143
1991 234 175 748 3,271 132 5 – 2 95
1992 235 105 447 1,528 134 27 – – 74
1993 144 109 757 1,308 66 11 – – 67
1994 121 104 860 1,484 51 6 – – 64
1995 88 50 568 393 33 – – – 55
1996 85 79 929 893 19 1 – – 65
1997 78 44 564 445 18 3 57
1998 129 146 1,132 1,452 28 23 – – 78
1999 198 40 22 – – 136
Source: Ministry of Labour, Yearbook of Labour Statistics, several issues.
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Table 2
Labour Disputes in Taiwan 1980–99
Dispute Causes
Total Total Workers Workers Working
disputes disputes Labour Occupational Other involved per dispute days lost
by case by issue contracts Wages Retirement hazards causes (1,000s) (persons) (days)
1980 626 6.3 10
1981 891 7.1 8
1982 1,153 9.5 8
1983 921 12.3 13
1984 907 9.1 10
1985 1,443 15.5 11
1986 1,485 11.3 8
1987 1,609 15.7 10
1988 1,314 1,314 278 208 409 163 256 24.2 18 8,967
1989 1,943 1,943 710 489 234 206 304 62.4 32 24,157
1990 1,860 1,860 788 418 202 191 261 34.1 18 828
1991 1,810 2,082 836 528 210 233 275 12.7 7 –
1992 1,803 2,100 848 557 185 224 286 12.4 7 13,783
1993 1,878 2,191 852 548 207 234 350 37.9 20 –
1994 2,061 2,351 931 643 210 295 272 30.9 15 –
1995 2,271 2,523 962 761 257 272 271 27.3 12 46,926
1996 2,659 2,946 1,271 891 239 262 283 21.7 8 2,210
1997 2,600 2,795 1,172 737 251 366 269 81.0 31 1,098
1998 4,138 4,465 1,945 1,321 306 493 400 103.6 25 630
1999 5,860 na 2,976 1,953 na 656 30.4 5 1,375
Nb. From 1991, cases of industrial disputes could be officially classified as having more than one cause.
Source: Council of Labor Affairs, Monthly Bulletin of Labor Statistics, several issues.
L
A
B
O
U
R
A
N
D
N
E
O
-L
IB
E
R
A
L
G
L
O
B
A
L
IZ
A
T
IO
N
165
Table 3
Labour Unionization Levels in Korea and Taiwan 1980–1998
KOREA TAIWAN
Union Industrial
Union Union Occupational Industrial membership/ unions
membership Unionization membership unions unions total only/total
(1,000s) rate (%) (1,000s) (1,000s) only (1,000a) employed (%) employed (%)
1980 948 20.1
1981 967 19.6
1982 984 19.1
1983 1,010 18.1
1984 1,011 16.8
1985 1,004 15.7
1986 1,036 15.5 1,724
1987 1,267 17.3 2,100 1,369 704 26.2 8.8
1988 1,707 22.0 2,261 1,564 696 27.9 8.6
1989 1,932 23.3 2,420 1,722 698 29.3 8.5
1990 1,887 21.5 2,757 2,057 699 33.3 8.4
1991 1,803 19.6 2,942 2,249 693 34.9 8.2
1992 1,735 18.3 3,058 2,389 669 35.4 7.8
1993 1,667 17.2 3,172 2,521 651 36.2 7.4
1994 1,659 16.3 3,278 2,641 637 36.7 7.1
1995 1,615 15.2 3,136 2,537 598 34.6 6.6
1996 1,599 14.7 3,048 2,461 588 33.6 6.5
1997 1,484 13.5 2,959 2,369 590 32.2 6.4
1998 1,402 13.8 2,927 2,351 576 31.5 6.2
Source: Ministry of Labour, Republic of Korea, Yearbook of Labour Statistics, several issues; CLA, Monthly Bulletin, Taiwan
Area, Republic of China, several issues.
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Table 4
GNP, GNP Per Capita and Manufacturing Unit Labour Costs in Korea and Taiwan
1970–2001
GNP per GNP per GNP growth GNP growth Index of Index of
capita ($US) capita ($US) rate (% pa) rate (% pa) ULC ($US) ULC ($US)
Korea Taiwan Korea Taiwan Korea Taiwan
1980 1,589 2,344 7.9 9.7 na 43.4
(1971–80) (1970–80)
1985 2,047 3,297 7.5 7.1 55.0 51.3
(1980–85) (1980–85)
1986 2,296 3,993 12.5 11.6 53.0 55.6
1987 3,218 5,298 12.3 12.7 60.6 66.3
1988 4,295 6,379 12.0 7.8 77.8 75.5
1989 5,210 7,626 6.9 8.2 91.6 85.2
1990 5,883 8,111 9.6 5.4 93.0 89.7
1991 6,757 8.982 9.1 7.6 100.3 91.1
1992 6,988 10,506 5.0 7.5 100.0 100.0
1993 7,484 10,956 5.8 7.0 102.7 98.1
1994 8,467 11,781 8.4 7.1 106.8 99.0
1995 10,037 12,653 8.7 6.4 124.3 99.2
1996 10,543 13,225 6.8 6.1 125.9 95.4
1997 9,511 13,559 5.0 6.7 100.2 89.5
1998 6,750 12,333 −6.7 4.6 65.8 77.4
1999 8,551 13,248 10.9 5.7 68.8 78.3
2000 9,628 14,188 9.3 5.9 70.2 78.1
2001 8,900 12,941 3.0 −1.9 64.7 69.4
Source: National Statistical Office, Major Statistics of Korean Economy, several issues;
Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Republic of China,
Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China, several issues, Department of Labour (US),
Foreign Labour Statistics (www.bls.gov/fls/home.htm).
lost in post-1987 Korea (393,000 in an employed population of 20.8
million).
Korean and Taiwanese labour used the democratic opening to
advance their membership base (Table 3). In Korea, the unionization
rate peaked at 23.3 per cent in 1989 and went into decline
thereafter. There was rapid growth in Taiwan’s unionization rate
during the late 1980s. As a proportion of the total employed, union
membership accounted for 36.7 per cent in 1994. Such a figure
however, gives an inflated picture of labour’s organizational strength.
The growth of labour unionization in Taiwan was exaggerated by
the rise of occupational unionism (as opposed to workplace based
industrial unionism). Membership of occupational or craft unions was
a channel through which predominantly self-employed workers (e.g.
taxi drivers) could gain access to state benefits like health insurance.
In reality, the development of such unions tended to dilute labour’s
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collective identity. Their numerical preponderance strengthened the
representation of the politically apathetic against those seeking to
bolster labour’s autonomy from the state. If the membership of
occupational unions is excluded, then the ‘true’ rate of unionization
(i.e. of industrial unions only) in Taiwan was considerably lower than
in Korea.
In spite of defeats and membership declines from the late 1980s,
organized labour made some permanent gains in its political position.
Democratization afforded the opportunity for labour unions to develop
their national centres or federations. Through such centres, labour
could coordinate national level actions. National labour centres also
helped to promote labour autonomy by countering the tendency of
managements to dominate company labour unions (the basic level of
union structure inherited from authoritarianism). Authoritarianism
had compelled all labour unions to affiliate with one officially-licenced
national labour organization, the Federation of Korean Trade Unions
in Korea and Chinese Federation of Labour in Taiwan.8 In Korea,
unofficial activists had vigorously challenged the authority of company
labour representatives since the late 1970s.9 After democratization,
the representational monopoly of the FKTU was challenged by the
emergence of a rival militant national centre, the National Council
of Trade Unions, composed of unions newly organised since 1987.
The militancy of the rival federation alienated important middle
class opinion and triggered the crackdown by the Roh regime in
1991. But its active stance (not to mention grassroots opinion) also
forced the state-sponsored FKTU into taking a more independent
and critical line. Sobered by the failures of its past militancy and
with its internecine disputes over, the NCTU was relaunched as the
Korea Confederation of Trade Unions in 1995. That the KCTU was
accorded equal representation with the FKTU on important national
deliberation panels (e.g. Presidential Commission on Labour Reform
in 1996 and the Tripartite Committee in 1998), even though it was
8 The FKTU was established in 1946 as a right-wing instrument against the leftist
unions that were then in the ascendancy. It was reorganized in 1961 by the military
junta. The CFL was first formed on the mainland in 1928 and reorganized when the
KMT retreated to Taiwan in 1950. Whereas the FKTU was the creation firstly of a
charismatic dictator and then of the military junta, the CFL was the extension of the
one party regime. Its unshifting allegiance to the KMT would therefore last as long
as the KMT retained state power.
9 Asia Monitor Resource Centre, Min Ju No Jo: South Korea’s New Unions (Hong
Kong: Asia Monitor Resource Centre, 1987), pp. 42–50.
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formally illegal, was indicative of the following it had built up. Both
the FKTU and the KCTU coordinated the mass strikes in response to
the December 1996 labour legislation. As of 1999, the KCTU claimed
573,000members (out of a total of 1.49million labour unionmembers
officially listed for that year).
Taiwanese labour unions have faced similar obstacles in the de-
velopment of an independent national federation. The CFL, like the
FKTU has remained attached to state funding. But unlike its Korean
counterpart, theCFL failed to assert amore independent line from the
rulingKMT (e.g. its board chairmanwas elected to theKMT’s Central
Standing Committee in 1997). The CFL’s linkage with the KMT
party-state was stronger than the FKTU allegiance to the Korean
regime. The CFL-KMT linkage persisted despite the emergence of
more militant and independent labour leaders at the industrial and
local levels. As in Korea, within Taiwan’s democratic regime, the
Labour Union Law allowed for only one national federation to exist.
The formation of the TCTU was declared in 1998 with a membership
of 300,000 industrial union members (i.e. over half of that category).
It was, however, not until the KMT’s loss of the presidency in 2000
that the CFL separated itself from the party and the rival Taiwan
Confederation of Trade Unions was able to gain legal recognition.
Labour unions also bolstered their organizational strength and
influence from their political interactions. Under authoritarianism,
independent political activity by labour unions was strictly proscribed
in the name of national security. The role of labour organizations
was to mobilize worker enthusiasm behind the regime’s political and
economic goals. Democratization gave labour unions the opportunity
to initiate their own political agendas. The mobilization potential of
labour unions alsomade thempotentially attractive allies to politicians
and parties. In spite of severe institutional restraints, ties between
labour and opposition politicians and activists were first established
during the era of united opposition to authoritarianism. The main
opposition leader in Korea, Kim Dae-Jung, had been supporting
fairer distribution ever since 1971. In place of labour repression, Kim
argued for a more inclusive approach under the slogan of ‘democratic
market economy’.10 Many labour activists supported Kim as the
most progressive of the conservative mainstream politicians. A factor
10 Dae-Jung Kim, Mass Participatory Economy: A Democratic Alternative for Korea
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University-University Press of America, 1995) and
DJnomics: ANewFoundation for the Korean Economy (1999) (www.democracy-market.org).
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preventing labour from uniting behind Kim was the regional factor in
Korean politics, a factor which outweighed ideological considerations
at election times. For Kim, pan-regional electoral coalitions could
be forged by appealing to labour. Being the political boss of the
smaller region, he could not capture the presidency on the basis of
regional appeal alone. In both countries, support for labour became
one component of the oppositional platform but it did not become the
dominant component.
The labour movement in Taiwan has also fostered mutually
beneficial relations with the main opposition party. Taiwan’s main
opposition party, the pro-independence DPP, was looking to expand
its electoral base and sought labour support. By the early 1990s,
its appeal on the basis of Taiwanese identity and independence was
reaching its limits. Labour was attracted to the DPP, factions of which
(notably New Tide) held strong pro-labour sympathies. Also attractive
was the DPP’s success at capturing local government power. Under
Taiwan’s decentralized administrative system, DPP control of local
administrations delivered material advantages to the labour unions
and was a spur to the formation of union organizations.11 Access to
local political power and resources compensated for the continuing
dominance of the central CFL by the KMT party-state. Some DPP
legislators actively supported the campaign to legalize the TCTU.12
In refusing to legalize the rival TCTU, the ruling KMT correctly
calculated that it could not count on the support of the new federation.
The ban in turn reinforced the TCTU’s support for the oppositionDPP
(which made legalization a plank of its electoral platform in the 2000
presidential contest).
That organized labour’s political influence had its limits in Korea
and Taiwan was evident from the failure of labour based political
parties. In Taiwan, some pro-labour sections of the opposition DPP
and other activists launched the moderately socialist Labour Party
in 1987 and then the more openly leftist Workers’ Party in 1989.
Korean socialist parties proved equally fractious and unpopular
(e.g. the People’s Party got less than one per cent of the vote
in the 1992 legislative election). The attempt to translate labour
activism into electoral support encountered formidable obstacles.
Being identified as ‘left-wing’ was a serious political liability in
11 Huang, ‘Learning the New Game’, pp. 8–10.
12 ‘Quanchangong zhengqu hefahua’ [TCTU seeks legalization], Ziyou Shibao
[Freedom Times], (20 October 1998).
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societies where socialism had only recently been harshly proscribed.
Unionized workers continued to represent a relatively privileged
minority of the labour force working for public monopolies or private
oligopolies. In Taiwan, the rapid union membership expansion led
to the preponderance of those who were politically apathetic and
primarily interested in access to state benefits. Politically, labour’s
political participation was hindered by the remnants of authoritarian
legislation. For example, Korean public sector workers (including
teachers) were prohibited from joining labour unions and the labour
unions themselves were prohibited frommaking financial donations to
political parties. Given that existing opposition parties were already
well established, and embraced the labour issue to some extent, it
made sense for labour unions to advance their cause by association
with those parties. More successful has been the formation of labour
support groups by new middle class activists (academics, journalists,
students) like the Citizens Coalition for Economic Justice in Korea.13
and the Taiwan Labour Front (some of whose activists would become
advisers in the labour ministry under the DPP). Relying on well
researched arguments and peaceful tactics that win over public
opinion, the activities of these groups complemented the labour
unions’ more direct tactics and gave respectabiity to the labour cause.
Economic and Ideological Conditions
Marketization strategies do not usually require extreme authoritarian
concomitants of type seen in countries likeChile. In the right economic
and ideological context, moderate legal restraints tend to suffice.
Radical pro-market reforms are typically introduced in response to
economic crises when organized labour resistance is demoralized by
high unemployment and the absence of viable alternatives. In Latin
American countries like Argentina and Brazil, the failure of the
heterodox stabilization programmes of the late 1980s marked the last
gasp of the populist-statist alternative to neo-liberalism. Korea took
a bold step towards the liberalization of labour markets in early 1998
when the economy was suffering its worst crisis in 40 years. Escaping
relatively lightly from the 1997 Asian crisis, Taiwan’s economy
nevertheless experienced a slowdown. In both Korea and Taiwan, the
13 Su-Hoon Lee (1993) ‘Transitional Politics of Korea, 1987–1992: Activation of
Civil Society’, Pacific Affairs, 66, 3 (1993) pp. 351–67, pp. 363–5.
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debate about the merits of labour market reform intensified during
the mid-1990s as concerns grew about the loss of competitiveness
(as demonstrated by the flight of manufacturing investment to
continental Asia). But neither Korea nor Taiwan experienced the
kind of prolonged economic and ideological crises associated with the
introduction of neo-liberal programmes elsewhere. As Tables 4 and
5 indicate, despite the slowdown of growth by historical standards (a
sign of industrial maturity), the macroeconomic context right up to
the 1997 crisis was one of robust growth with tight labour markets.
Economic crises generate ideological pressures to rethink
development strategies. Generally speaking, the deeper the crisis
of statist economics, the more converts are won over to neo-liberal
alternatives, and the poorer the economy, the higher the stakes
attached to economic policy change. The ideological crisis can produce
polarization at both elite and mass levels between the supporters
of the economic status quo and the neo-liberal alternative. Under
such circumstances, the neo-liberal recovery programme can only
be initiated with the application of considerable force against its
opponents. The authoritarian neo-liberal experiments of Chile and
Argentina during the 1970s are examples of this pattern of transition.
But more recent experiences from Latin America and Eastern Europe
show that a neo-liberal resolution of the ideological crisis can follow
a democratic sequence. In such a scenario, mass discontent with the
failures of statism forces economic policy shift in a radical neo-liberal
direction. In such a situation of ‘neo-liberal populism’, even those who
stand to lose out from neo-liberal reform programmes support the
policy change.14 By contrast, the background of growth meant that
Korea and Taiwan were not faced with such absolute choices about
economic policy reform. That Korea and Taiwan did not approach the
patterns of ideological crisis resembling those described above can be
seen from the nature of the debate about labour market reform in the
policy community.
Thenewdemocratic regimes ofKorea andTaiwanwere undoubtedly
pro-business regimes that accepted the principle of economic liberali-
zation. The economic liberalization cautiously started by authoritarian
regimes in the early 1980s was continued by their democratic succes-
sors. In Korea, the arrival of a reformist president in the shape of
Kim Young-Sam in 1993 gave fresh impetus to reform. Using the
14 For example, Kurt Weyland, ‘Neoliberal Populism in Latin America and Eastern
Europe’, Comparative Politics,31(1999), pp. 379–401.
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term ‘globalization’ to characterize his government’s policy direction,
Kim was eager to leave his historical mark as the leader responsible
for completing Korea’s democratization and economic liberalization.
Under his leadership, Korea joined the WTO (1995) and the OECD
(1996). Liberalization was seen as the answer to the erosion of
national competitiveness caused by the ‘high cost, low efficiency’
economic structure. The over-regulated labour market was identified
as one source of these ‘costs’ (together with land, transport and
interest rates). From 1996, reform of the labour market and the
institutional basis of labour relations was accorded high priority with
the establishment of a Presidential Commission on Labour Reform.
For Taiwanese labour unions, 1996 was also a significant year. Having
obtained a direct electoral mandate that year, the KMT accelerated
the introduction of the market approach in response to concerns
about declining competitiveness (symptoms of which were the outflow
of investment to continental Asia and the recruitment of migrant
labour). For example, the National Development Conference initiated
the programme for the privatization of 42 SOEs (the most unionized
sector of the economy) in five years.
Part of awider pro-liberalization campaign, business circles inKorea
and Taiwan called for the repeal of protective labour legislation which
they deemed to be institutional impediments to the efficient working
of the labour market. Ironically, most of these laws were passed by
authoritarian regimes (Figure 1). In the post-authoritarian labour
environment, the constraints that previously made labour flexible
were being undermined. Protective labour laws that previously could
be disregarded now had to be observed. The Federation of Korean
Industries (the peak organization of the top30 business conglomerates
or chaebol) complained about the slow pace of deregulation and
challenged the government to allow market forces to enter the
‘sacred precincts’ of the economy like finance and SOEs15 while
the Korea Employers’ Federation (KEF) argued that excessive wage
increases were eroding national competitiveness. For example, KEF
used data showing Korean manufacturing wages to be very high at the
$10,000 GNP per capita level compared with other economies at the
15 Il-Joong Kim, ‘The Results and Future Course of Korea’s Deregulation Policy’,
in Il-Joong Kim, ed., The Role of the Three Branches of Government for the Rule of Law and the
Free Market in Korea (Seoul: Korea Economic Research Institute, 1995), pp. 169–204,
at p. 191.
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corresponding stage of development.16 Emphasizing the detrimental
effects of high labour costs on competitiveness, Taiwan’s business
community lobbied for the revision of the Labour Standards Law of
1984.17
Influential though it was, the business perspective did not achieve
the kind of intellectual dominance in Korea and Taiwan that it did
elsewhere. Critics, especially in Korea, countered the main business
claims about the harmful economic effects of allegedly over-regulated
labour markets. Korean labour think-tanks held business responsible
for raising production cost through under-investment in facility
and involvement in speculative activities.18 Critics (and mainstream
commentators) viewed business’ emphasis on minimizing local labour
costs (e.g. constantly comparing them with unmatchably low labour
cost in mainland China) as indicative of a regressive mentality that
failed to see labour an asset to be developed through investment.19
Data in Table 4 showing fallingULCs in Korea and an annual increase
of only two per cent for Taiwan between1985 and1999 lend support to
this view. The relevance of Japanese and European alternatives to neo-
liberal employment systems were emphasized by Korean, Taiwanese
16 Korean Employers Federation, Industrial Relations and the Labour Market in Korea
1996 (Seoul: Korea Employers’ Federation 1996), p. 34.
17 Yin-Wah Chu (1996) ‘Democracy and Organized Labor in Taiwan: The 1996
Transition’, Asian Survey 36, 5 (1996) pp. 495–510, especially pp. 507–8, 509–10.
18 For example, Soo-Bong Uh, International Competitiveness in Trade and Investment:
Challenges and Opportunities for Trade Unions. The Case of Korea (Seoul: Research Centre
of the FKTU, 1995) p. 52.
19 Ronald A. Rogers, ‘The Role of Industrial Relations in Recent National and
Enterprise Level Industrial Strategies in the Republic of Korea’, in Lawrence Krause
and Fun-Koo Park, eds, Social Issues in Korea: Korean and American Perspectives, (Seoul:
KDI Press, 1993), pp. 67–108, at p. 77; Thomas A. Kochan, ‘Industrial Relations and
Human Resource Policy in Korea: Options for Continued Reform’ in Lee-Jay Cho and
Yoon-Hyung Kim, eds, Korea’s Political Economy: An Institutional Perspective (Boulder:
Westview Press 1994) pp. 663–97, at pp. 679–82; Takeshi Inagami, ‘Labour Market
Policies in Asian Countries: Diversity and Similarity Among Singapore, Malaysia, the
Republic of Korea and Japan’, ILOEmployment and Training Papers, 34, (1998) pp. 52–3;
Mao-Xing Zeng ‘Guanchang wenti jingyan tan’ [Discussion on the experience of the
problem of plant closure] Paper delivered at the TCTU National Conference, Kaohsiung
(29–30 September 1999); Taipei Times, ‘Labour is a Crucial Factor to Industry’
(8 December 2000). Inagami argues that whereas the Japanese model prioritizes
the investment in the development of employee skills (with its connotations of
cooperation and long term employment stability), Korean management sees the
import of superior technology as the path to productivity growth (despite the official
government emphasis on training).
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and foreign commentators. These included functional flexibility20
labour participation in decision-making21 and societal corporatism.22
Faced with a more active labour movement and influenced by
visions of societal corporatism advocated by influential commentators,
the Korean state’s strategy towards labour was more explicitly
inclusionary. The Kim Young-Sam government used the term ‘social
consensus’. In seeking to bridge the deep labour-business divide,
tripartite structures of societal corporatism had been advocated and
experimented with since 1991 (when the first tripartite roundtable
was convened). Even the ill-fated labour reform of December 1996
contained provisions for the extension of labour’s legal rights (to
be granted in exchange for labour’s acceptance of labour market
flexibility reforms). Facing a weaker labourmovement, Taiwan’s KMT
regime was less receptive to notions of tripartism. In 1999, it planned
new restrictions (e.g. bans on strikes in key industries, mandatory
cooling off, ending of compulsory arbitration) through revision of
the 1988 Settlement of Labour Disputes Act. These proposals were
20 Where ‘functional flexibility’ denotes labour mobility within a firm (in which
labour is guaranteed somedegree of security) while ‘numerical flexibility’ denotes ease
of hire and fire. The former entails long term worker commitment to the firm (hence
greater security of employment) and was said to be more suitable to Korea’s work
traditions. See Johngseok Bae et al., ‘Korean Industrial Relations at the Crossroads:
The Recent Labour Troubles’, Asia Pacific Business Review, Spring (1997), pp. 148–60,
pp. 155–7.
21 Shi-RongWang, ‘Laogong zhengce yu qiye fazhan’ [Labour policy and enterprise
development], Paper at the Conference on Government-Enterprise Relations (Taipei: National
Chengchi University, April 1988); Zhi-Xiang Han, ‘Laodong canyu ji zuzhi huanjing’
[Labour Participation andOrganizational Environment] in Council of Labour Affairs,
ed., Jiaru shijie maoyi zuzhi dui laodong shichang de chongji yu yinying zhengce: lunwen ji
[Impact of WTO Entry on the Labour Market and the Appropriate Policy Response:
A Discussion Paper] (Taipei: CLA, 1997) pp. 197–235; Zhi-Yue Cheng (2000)
‘Laozi guanxi tixi minzhuhua de yiyi yu fangxiang’ [The Meaning and Future of
the Democratic Industrial Relations System], in Yun-Han Chu and Tzong-Ho Bau,
eds, Minzhu zhuanxing yu jingji chongtu: jiushi niandai taiwan jingji fazhan de kunjing yu
tiaozhan [Democratic Transition and Economic Conflict: Problems and Challenges of
Taiwan’s Economic Development in the 1990s] (Taipei: Laureate Book Co., 2000)
pp. 155–80.
22 Presidential Commission on Economic Restructuring, Realigning National
Priorities for Economic Advance: Presidential Report on Economic Restructuring (Seoul: 1988),
pp. 101–48; David Lindauer, and Ezra Vogel, ‘Toward a Social Compact for Korean
Labour’, Harvard Institute for International Development Discussion Paper 317 (1989);
Keun Lee and Chung H. Lee (1992) ‘Sustaining Economic Development in South
Korea: Lessons from Japan’, Pacific Review, 5, 1 (1992), pp. 13–24; Rogers, ‘The Role
of Industrial Relations’; Chalmers Johnson, ‘What is the Best System of National
Economic Management for Korea?’, in Cho and Kim, eds, Korea’s Political Economy,
pp. 63–85, at p. 82.
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overtaken by the 2000 presidential election campaign (during which
the KMT candidate took a conciliatory attitude on the labour issue).
That the democratic regimes of Korea and Taiwan were following
courses that were pro-business rather than neo-liberal could also
be seen from the overall context of development strategy in which
liberalizing reform occurred. While responding to local and foreign
demands for financial liberalization, the governments of Korea and
Taiwan continued to limit foreign capital inflows (long term flows in
Korea, short term ones in Taiwan) New developmentalist measures
were introduced alongside liberalizing ones. In place of the policy
loan, the Korean and Taiwanese governments initiated functional
industrial supports and took the lead in areas where private initiative
was thought to be lacking.23 Apart from the introduction of new
forms of ‘market conforming’ intervention, economic liberalization
also coincided with the growth of the state’s social expenditure
(Table 5).
Although the driving force behind the improvement of living
standards during the era of authoritarian developmentalism was
employment generation, the state was not immune from taking
redistributional and welfare initiatives. As is well known, the
developmental states were built on successful land reforms of
the 1950s. Moreover, redistributional and welfare initiatives were
consistent with the paternalistic ideologies and security concerns
of the ruling KMT in Taiwan and the military in Korea. Such
measures were being stepped up even before the democratic opening
as the state sought to pre-empt social protest by acknowledging
the problem of relative inequality. In Taiwan, these included the
Labour Standards Law of 1984 and the creation of the Council
of Labour Affairs for the enforcement of the LSL in 1987 (labour
issues had previously been a security matter under the Ministry of
the Interior). In Korea, the fifth (1981–6) and sixth economic plans
(1977–91) stressed social development while a minimum wage law
was passed in 1986. After democratization, welfarist policies were
extended in response to higher public expectations. For example,
Korea’s Employment Insurance Law of 1993 created the basis of
23 Yun-Han Chu, ‘The East Asian NICs: A State-Led Path to the DevelopedWorld’,
in Barbara Stallings, ed., Global Change, Global Response: The New International Context of
Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1995), pp. 199–237; Heather
Smith, ‘Taiwan’s Industrial Policy in the 1980s’, Asian Economic Journal, 11, 1, (1997),
pp. 407–41.
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Table 5
Unemployment and Social Expenditure in Korea and Taiwan 1970–2000
Rate of Unemployment Social expenditure/public expenditure
KOREA (%) TAIWAN (%) KOREA (%) TAIWAN (%)
1970 4.5 1.7
1975 4.1 2.4
1980 5.2 1.2 6.4
1985 4.0 2.9 6.8 6.3
1986 3.8 2.7 7.9 6.6
1987 3.1 2.0 8.2 5.8
1988 2.5 1.7 7.8 7.6
1989 2.6 1.6 8.9 5.4
1990 2.4 1.7 8.9 8.8
1991 2.3 1.5 10.2 9.8
1992 2.4 1.5 9.7 8.6
1993 2.8 1.5 9.2 8.3
1994 2.4 1.6 9.0 8.7
1995 2.0 1.8 8.1 12.1
1996 2.0 2.6 8.6 15.7
1997 2.6 2.7 9.2 15.7
1998 6.8 2.7 9.8 14.2
1999 6.3 2.9 11.4 13.7
2000 4.1 3.2 11.9 16.9
Source: NSO,Major Statistics, several issues; DGBAS, Statistical Yearbook, several issues.
a social welfare system while the ruling KMT regime in Taiwan
extended the health insurance system beyond government employees
in1995. In effect, while expanding the role of themarket, the statewas
simultaneously promoting counter measures against market failure.
Support for a version of reform that would counter-balance
liberalization with enhanced legal and social protections for labour
also extended to the opposition parties. Both Kim Dae-Jung in Korea
and Taiwan’s DPP were strongly committed to market economics.
In power, Kim accelerated the economic liberalization programme.
Having expressed his preference for delaying privatization during the
election,24 President Chen and his newDPP government soon renewed
the KMT’s privatization policies. Where the KMT saw privatization
as a means of building regime support by creating popular capitalism
24 ‘Quanguo chanzhonggong ban zhengjianhui: wu zu housuanren geshu jijian’
[TCTU Holds Political Forum: Five Candidates Voice Their Opinions], Gongshang
Shibao [Commerical Times] (1March 2000).
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and of transferring lucrative assets to business allies,25 theDPP viewed
it equally approvingly from the perspective of taking the KMT party-
state influence out of the economy (e.g. by ending the susceptibility of
state employees to KMT electoral pressure).
Such a stance was not merely born of political calculation. Nor was
it as contradictory with their pro-labour records as first appeared. It
reflected a vision of economic pluralism in which competitive markets
and social objectives could be reconciled. In the years of opposition,
the focus of themain opposition critique was notmarket capitalism per
se, but rather the bureaucratic authoritarian form of capitalism. From
this perspective, a market economy with the proper regulation and
social counter-balances (as provided by a legalized labour movement
and well developed civic groups) would represent an advance towards
economic pluralism rather than regression as would be perceived from
the traditional socialist or statist-populist standpoints. Korea’s under-
reliance onmarket forces was a point repeatedlymade byKimDae-Jung
during his years of opposition. In his vision of ‘democratic market
economy’, he argued that economic decisions should be based on
market criteria while the extension of opportunities for labour unions,
small and medium industry (SMI), TNCs would reduce of power of
the traditionally powerful conglomerate-state alliance. Similarly, in
Taiwan, the DPP was selectively pro-labour but not anti-business. It
had always had close links with the small entrepreneurs discontented
with the pro-SOE, pro-party owned enterprise, pro-heavy industry
bias of the KMT regime. In the attempt to shed its anti-business
image, the DPP established regular contacts with some of Taiwan’s
top industrialists in the run up the 2000 election.26 President Chen
Shui-Bian has even characterized his political philosophy in terms of
a social market ‘third way’.27
At the level of mass opinion, there was neither ideological polariza-
tion between the supporters of neo-liberalism and statist economics,
nor the ‘neo-liberal populism’ born of disillusionment with the
failures of statism. While supporting economic liberalization (with
25 Huai-Nan Zu, ‘Gongying shiye minyinghua wenti tantao’ [An Investigation into the
Privatization Issue], Paper delivered at the TCTU National Conference, Kaohsiung, (29–30
September 1999).
26 These included the leaders of business groups such as Evergreen, Formosa
Plastics, ChinaChemical andChina Petroleum. See Shelley Rigger,DPP2000, (2000)
(http://maple.he.net/∼dpp2000/platform.htm).
27 Chen Shui-Bian The ThirdWay of Taiwan: A New Political Perspective. Lecture at the
London School of Economics, University of London (6 December 1999).
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its benefits of consumer choice and opportunities for accumulation),
public opinion in Korea and Taiwan also expected the state to
continue to perform an effective economic and social role. Whereas
middle class opinion swung in favour of neo-liberalism in Latin
America, it was more moderate in Korea and Taiwan. The middle
classes’ support for labour fluctuated according to their perception
of the justness of the labour cause. In Korea, the middle classes
sympathized with labour strikes in the immediate aftermath of
democratization but then supported the anti-labour crackdown in
1991 when militancy was seen to be damaging the national economy.
This has been interpreted as evidence of the divergence of interests
between the middle and working classes after the unifying objective
of democratization had been achieved.28 But the strong middle
class support (especially from white-collar workers in industries like
broadcasting) for the labour protest against the Kim Young-Sam
government’s labour laws in early 199729 suggests such a view to be
too pessimistic. Similarly in Taiwan,middle classes have supported the
labour causes perceived to be reasonable (protests in the aftermath
of democratization, in the demands for the reduction of the working
week) but opposed those demands that appeared to be excessive (such
as the Chunghua Telecom workers’ demands for job security and
substantial privatization benefits in summer 2000). The proliferation
of pro-redistributional civic groups consisting largely of middle class
activists is another indicator of the potential for correspondence
between middle class and organized labour interests. And in both
countries, corruption cases and avoidable disasters (like collapsing
buildings) regularly remind the middle classes of the social failings of
unaccountable capitalism.
The mixed results for the labour unions since the alternation of
power lend support to the above analysis. Both President Kim Dae-
Jung and President Chen Shui-Bian’s party, the DPP, were known for
their sympathy to labour and other politically excluded constituencies.
Thus the DPP victory appeared to herald a major pro-labour shift.30
28 Joo-hee Lee, ‘Class structure and Class Consciousness in South Korea’, Journal
of Contemporary Asia, 27, 2 (1997), pp. 135–55.
29 Barry K. Gills andDong-Sook S. Gills (2000) ‘Globalization and Strategic Choice
in South Korea: Economic Reform and Labour’, in Samuel K. Kim, ed., Korea’s
Globalization (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 29–53, at p. 42.
30 Taipei Times, ‘Government should be firm with Chunghua’, (25 August 2000);
Zhongguo Shibao [China Times] ‘Laogong zhengce kaishi xiang laofang qingxiang’ [Labour
Policy Begins to Tilt Towards Labour] (16 June 2000).
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For the labour unions, the institutional environment has been altered
as a result. The radical rival labour federation, the TCTU was finally
legalized in May 2000. Activists with pro-labour sympathies also
came to be located in advisory roles in key ministries, including the
CLA.31 In Korea, the Kim Dae-Jung regime inherited a bad crisis.
Unable to compromise when economic conditions were favourable,
the representatives of labour and business belatedly agreed to join a
social pact for recovery (Tripartite Committee). This was the first such
arrangement in industrializing Asia and broke with Korea’s history
of intensified labour repression during economic downturns. Labour
gained institutional reforms including the legalization of the radical
KCTU, the right to multiple unions and third party involvement
in disputes, and partial union rights for key public sector workers.
President Kim also appointed a number of former social activists as
his advisers.32
Yet the limits of labour influence on the new governments are
also very apparent. While granting labour new political rights
and some social measures,33 both governments have continued the
marketization strategies begun by their predecessors. For example,
the DPP government in Taiwan is continuing with the privatization
programme initiated by the KMT and stood firm when challenged
by the well organized Chunghua Telecom labour unions. In Korea,
while introducing new labour rights and social welfare reforms, the
Kim Dae-Jung government nevertheless persisted with the painful
restructuring and liberalization reforms mandated by the IMF. These
include implementation of the March 1997 labour reforms resisted
by the labour unions, liquidation of hopeless enterprises, privatization
and the sale of cash strapped enterprises to foreign buyers.
31 For example, Prof. Jason Chin-Hsin Liu, formerly of the Taiwan Labour Front.
32 For example, Prof. Jin-Soon Lee, formerly of theCitizen’s Coalition for Economic
Justice.
33 In Taiwan, the attempt by the DPP government to pass legislation for a shorter
working week has been bogged down by the inter-party wrangling, including by more
generous counter-proposals from the now opposition KMT that has a majority in the
legislative assembly. Pointing toTaiwan’s current economic problems (unemployment
at almost 3.19 per cent in December 2000 was an all time high), employers have
protested against the proposal to reduce the work week from 44 hours per week to
84 hours per fortnight.
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The Transitions in Korea and Taiwan Compared
While Korea and Taiwan shared commonalities that distinguished
them from the experiences of labour reform associated with neo-
liberalism, there also existed significant differences between the
two in the course of their transition towards more market driven
development strategies. In particular, the course of labour reform on
market principles proceeded with far less damaging labour resistance
and intellectual controversy in Taiwan. In Korea, labour flexibility
reforms could only be properly introduced after the economic collapse
of late 1997. The Korean state’s approach was also more explicity
inclusionary.
The Kim Young-Sam government, despite its slogan of globaliza-
tion, sought to integrate the labour unions into a wider consensus
for change. It formed a national deliberation panel consisting of
representatives from the national labour federations, business, civic
groups and academia. When the discussions became deadlocked,
the hardline anti-labour elements in the government gained the
ascendancy and this resulted in the introduction of a new labour law in
December 1996 (passed in a secret session that excluded opposition
legislators).34 The new law enshrined the principle of ‘no work, no
pay’, and facilitated the introduction of a flexible working week, easier
dismissal and the recruitment of temporary workers.35 It triggered
two months of damaging strikes that helped to worsen what was
already a severe export crisis associated with global over-capacity.
Labour protest actions including the first general strike since 1948,
were coordinated through the official FKTU and the unofficial KCTU.
The protesters did not alter the central provisions of the December
1996 legislation but extracted concessions from government over the
application of the law. These were contained in the revised version of
the law passed inMarch 1997. For example, the government promised
that dismissals would be sparingly applied (i.e. only after employers
had exhausted all other alternatives). These major labour reforms
would only become established in 1998 after the economy slipped into
negative growth and the alternation of power.
34 Byung-Kuk Kim and Hyun-Chin Lim, ‘Korean Labour Against Itself: Structural
Dilemmas of StateMonism’, in Larry Diamond and Byung-KukKim, eds,Consolidating
Democracy in South Korea (Boulder: Lynner Rienner, 2000), pp. 111–37, at pp. 130–1.
35 Jong-Kyu Park, ‘Chaegye wa nodonggye keukdanjuuiga pich’eun ch’ungdol’
[‘Confrontation Arising From Business and Labour Extremism’], Chosun Wolgan
[Choseon Monthly], February (1997), pp. 91–9.
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Ironically, the key turning points in the weakening of labour
resistance towards market reform took place after the alternation
of power to leaderships historically seen as sympathetic to labour. In
Korea, this occurred in August 1998 when workers of the Hyundai
Motor Company (one of Korea’s premier export plants) decided to
accept the employer’s lay off schedule. The decision set the tone of
retreat for the rest of the union movement as labour forces turned
their attention from job protection to severance compensation.36
In Taiwan, the new DPP government launched the privatization of
Chunghua in summer 2000, despite having supported a moratorium
in the election campaign a few months previously. With a well
organized labour union, Chunghua became a crucial test case of
labour resistance to privatization. Labour’s insistence on job and wage
guarantees (and stock options) meant that it could not elicit much
public sympathy.37 Vocal mass demonstrations (including a 7,000
strong rally) were unable to prevent the government from going ahead
with the programme in August 2000. The government made no secret
of its plan for many more privatizations.
Explaining the Variations
The variations in the paths of marketization can be explained with
reference to three sets of factors: economic structure, economic
ideology and the wider context of political competition. The influence
of these factors are summarized in Figure 3.
Whilst appearing to be very similar (especially during the labour-
intensive stage), the growth strategies and their outcomes had by
the 1990s, created rather different opportunities and constraints
for the labour movements of Korea and Taiwan. The economic
strategies of the two developmentalist regimes and the conceptions
of economic nationalism that lay behind them pointed to different
paths of evolution for the two labour movements. The Korean version
was more conducive to unionization because of the prevalence of large
scale plants and heavy industry concentrated around the chaebol. It
was also more centrally directed and so labour disputes easily became
politicized. Korea’s development strategy involved more overt social
36 Ho-Keun Song, ‘LabourUnions in the Republic of Korea: Challenge andChoice’,
ILO Labour and Society Programme Discussion Paper DP/107/1999, (1999), p. 29.
37 ‘Government Should be Firm with Chunghua’, Taipei Times, (25 August 2000).
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KOREA TAIWAN
Economic
structure and 
strategy 
• Conglomeration 
• Concerted heavy industrial
development
• SMI dominant 
• Moderation of heavy industrial
development from 1976 
Economic ideology • Maximize growth
• Industrialization self-sufficiency
'match Japan'
• Influence of societal corporatism
model
• Consistent and stable growth
• Integration with TNCs 
• Predominance of neo-classical 
economic models
Political
competition 
context 
• Military regimes 
• Centralized regime with no 
institutional safety valves 
• Single party-state 
• High degree of institutionalization:
potential opposition channelled into 
local politics 
• Opposition legitimized by 
nationalist historical legacy 
• Weak historical legacy of legitimate 
opposition 
International 
context 
• Diplomatic ascendancy
• Hostility to TNCs  
• Closure of North Korea 
• Inflexible management style 
• Diplomatic weakness  
• Open economics as surrogate form
of diplomacy
• Opportunities for industrial 
relocation to mainland China 
• Adaptable management style 
Figure 3. Sources of Variation in the Paths of Labour Market Reform in Korea and
Taiwan.
inequalities including business concentration, the squeeze on farmers
and the existence of rigid hierarchies in large scale plants organized
on military-style discipline. It also involved more serious economic
dislocations in the form of higher inflation and sharper contractions in
growth.These dysfunctionalitiesmadeKoreanworkersmore receptive
to politicization and radical influences (for example, from radical
students deliberately infiltrating the shopfloor). With the economy
so dependent on a few chaebol, Korean labour unions in those business
groups were capable of exerting great disruptive influence.
By contrast, the prevalence of small and medium industry (SMI)
in Taiwan was less conducive to the formation of ‘stable proletarian
communities’38 that was the basis of Korean unionization. It has been
observed that because SMI and non-protected sectors do not generate
monopoly rents, the incentive for assertive labour unionism (to gain
38 Frederic C. Deyo, ‘State and Labor: Modes of Political Exclusion in East
Asian Development’, in Frederic C. Deyo, ed., The Political Economy of the New Asian
Industrialism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 182–202, at p. 196.
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a share of those rents) does not exist either.39 There was a state
prioritized heavy industrial sector in Taiwan but it was smaller than
Korea’s (and on the whole efficiently run despite the prevalence of
state ownership amongst such enterprises). The public ownership
of strategic industries was due to Taiwan’s lack of experienced
industrialists and also to the regime’s political reservations about ‘big
capitalism’ (as a political challenge, as a source of social inequality
and target of discontent like the Korean chaebol). Taiwan’s phase
of heavy industrialization was not as prolonged as Korea’s, whose
heavy industrial ‘forced march’ created too many protected industries
(public and private) that were hyper-sensitive to growth fluctuations
but politically difficult to dismantle. From 1976 (Seventh Plan 1976–
81), the Taiwanese economy began its drive towards high technology
while Korea persisted with heavy chemical industrialization (HCI).
Taiwan’s developmentalism was more internationalized than
Korea’s. The prevalence of SMI and integration with TNCsmeant that
Taiwanese workers were less averse to market-oriented employment
systems with their associated insecurities. Labour reactions to the
partial privatizations of the China Steel Corporation (support) and
China Petroleum Development Corporation (opposition) in 1989
pointed to the existence of pragmatic attitudes amongst Taiwanese
workers even in the SOE sector, namely,motivation by the prospect for
gain and security under the new arrangement.40 If anything, foreign
corporations were preferred by Taiwanese workers. They were more
generous in their remuneration while being no more aggressive than
local employers in their managerial practices. Studies have shown job
mobility (and the aspiration to become a small entrepreneur) to be
deeply ingrained in the mentality of Taiwanese workers.41 Redundant
workers tended to be more concerned about severance compensation
than about preservation of the job itself.
That the vision of societal corporatism appealing to Koreans did not
assume much policy significance in Taiwan can also be traced to the
intellectual realm. We saw in the previous section that neo-liberal
39 Ju-Ho Lee and Dae-Il Kim, Labour Market Developments and Reforms in Korea (Seoul:
KDI, Working Paper 9703, 1997), p. 36.
40 Agnes Syu, From Economic Miracle to Privcatization Success: Initial Stages of the
Privatization Process in Two SOEs on Taiwan (Lanham,MD: University Press of America,
1995), pp. 174–7, 180–1.
41 Joseph E. Lee, ‘Economic Development and the Evolution of Industrial Relations
in Taiwan, 1950–1993’, in Anil Verma et al., eds, Employment Relations in the Growing
Asian Economies (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 88–118, at pp. 106–9.
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doctrines failed to achieve a dominant status in either Korea or
Taiwan. Having said that, Taiwan’s intellectual community was more
accommodating to market principles than Korea’s (even though
‘globalization’ was the official slogan in Seoul). In economics, the most
influential of the social sciences, market models tended to dominate
labour analysis amongst Taiwanese scholars whereas Korean ones
were more inclined towards political economy. Indeed, Kim Dae-Jung
has come under fire from Korean scholars for being too uncritical
towards neo-liberalism.42 Discussions about labour issues by Taiwan’s
CLA and in academic labour studies were heavily oriented towards
technical matters (like safety equipment).
The differences in the paths towards labour market reform were
also shaped by the political dimensions of the developmental state
and by the subsequent democratization processes. The KMT party-
state in Taiwan represented a more penetrating and cohesive form
of authoritarian regime than its counterpart in Korea. Modelled on a
Leninist pattern, the KMT regime was thoroughly reorganized soon
after its retreat from the Chinese mainland.43 Like other parts of
the state, the CFL became interlocked with the ruling KMT. When
the CFL did finally detach itself from the KMT in 2000, it could
only do so at the cost of further fragmentation as two breakaway
union groups emerged out of the CFL. With the existence of four
national federations, the potential for labour union solidarity was
badly damaged.44 By contrast, theKorean ‘bureaucratic authoritarian’
regime was not in place until the early 1960s. To the Japanese-trained
colonial bureaucratic and police apparatus was added a US-trained
military in the1950s (theKoreanCIAwas not established until1961).
By the time of the military seizure of power in 1961, civil dissent
was once more on the upsurge (a vibrant student movement and the
first attempts at independent labour organization since the anti-left
purges of 1945–7). This dissent was temporarily demobilized during
42 e.g. Byung-Yong Ahn, ‘Kimdaejung cheongbuga ppajilsu inneun shinjayujuui hamcheong’
[The Kim Dae-Jung Government is Falling into the Trap of Neo-Liberalism], Shin
Dong-A [New East Asia], April (1999), 86–92; Man-Woo Lee, ‘Konggieop minyeonghwa,
idaero kwaench’anna’ [Is the Privatization of Public Corporations Proceeding the Right
Way?] in Shin Dong-A [New East Asia] February (1999), 368–76.
43 Thomas B. Gold,State and Society in the TaiwanMiracle (Armonk, NY:M.E. Sharpe,
1986), pp. 59–64; Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, The Political Economy of
Democratic Transitions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), Ch. 8.
44 ‘Quanguo zhonggonghui yifen weisi’ [National Labour Union Federations Split Four
Ways], Zhongguo Shibao [China Times], (9 July 2000).
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the 1960s but not extinguished. Another source of opposition that the
regime had to coexist with was the conservative opposition political
parties. Military rule in Korea, suffered from the weakness of its
‘institutionalization’, that is, the capacity to make its rule legitimate
by channelling political energies through the official institutions of
representation. By the 1970s, elements of the conservative opposition
(likeKimDae-Jung in the1971 election)were championing the labour
cause. The issue also energized the dormant student movement. The
official failure to enforce protective labour provisions also stoked up
very extreme forms of labour protest (such as theChunTae-Il Incident
of 1971 in which a labourer commited suicide by self-immolation).
The ultra centralization of the Korean structure of government
(i.e. everything in and from Seoul) also tended to focus dissent against
the centre. By allowing ameasure of political activity at the local level,
the KMT succeeded in channelling the political energies of the hostile
local Taiwanese population away from the regime that arrived from
the mainland in 1950.
Taiwanese labour’s comparative adaptiveness to market forces has
also been shaped by the country’s peculiar international circums-
tances. In particular, diplomatic isolation since the loss of UN status in
1971 and increasing vulnerability tomainlandChina have encouraged
the Taiwanese state to become more accommodating to international
trends. This has had positive and negative implications for labour. For
example, placating US opinion was one factor shaping the passage
of the LSL in 1984. Participation in international labour federations
was also encouraged by the state as a form of quasi-diplomatic activity
(for example, the CFL joined the International Confederation of Free
Trade Unions). On the other hand, the search for diplomatic status
via economic contacts also facilitated labour flexibility (for example
in the form of official encouragement for the entry of TNCs). More
recently, the diplomatic priority of securing WTO membership has
outweighed any counter-arguments about job losses.
By contrast, the Korean state has not been forced to look to open
economics as a surrogate form of diplomatic recognition. On the
contrary, the achievement of economic and diplomatic superiority45
over communist North Korea by the early 1990s seemed to vindicate
the neo-mercantile model. The entry of foreign capital was (and
45 As confirmed by the joint entry of the Koreas into the UN in 1991, a move the
North had long opposed.
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still is) viewed as a threat to national economic sovereignty.46 The
nature of the principal diplomatic foe has also affected the labour
issue differently in Korea and Taiwan. The liberalizing mainland
Chinese economy has proved to be an irrestible magnet for Taiwanese
business in search of flexible, cheap labour in a culturally familiar
milieu (notwithstanding the political hostilities between the Taipei
and Beijing). The Korean peninsula, on the other hand, is mired in
an ideological stand off that leaves less space for private economic
initiatives. In spite of themuch talked about complementarity between
South Korean capital and North Korean labour (not to mention Kim
Dae-Jung’s ‘sunshine policy’ of separating economics and politics), the
transplantation of labour-intensive operations to the North has been
limited by political constraints. Even when it has relocated overseas
in areas like mainland China and Southeast Asia, Korean business
adapted badly because of its authoritarian style. These factors have
forced the Korean state to take a far more pro-active attitude towards
fostering a tripartite social compact at home than its Taiwanese
counterpart.
Conclusion
The recent evolution of the labour situation in Korea and Taiwan
illuminates the debate about comparative transitions to neo-
liberalism. It highlights the importance of developmentalism’s
legacies of growth and an effective state in structuring the subsequent
pathway of neo-liberalization. Governments in Korea and Taiwan
have promoted the acceleration of labour market reform from the
mid-1990s, but that change has been accompanied by distinctive
political, economic and ideological features marking it out from neo-
liberal transitions elsewhere. Specific background conditions shaped
a distinctive Northeast Asian path of accommodation with global
neo-liberalism in the realm of labour market reform and labour
relations. Even though Korea and Taiwan shared many common
features when contrasted with developing capitalisms elsewhere, it is
also apparent that Taiwan’s labour relations adjusted more smoothly
to the marketization drive than Korea’s. This difference is consistent
with previous experiences of political economic adjustment in response
46 For example, in the fall of 1999, car workers of the bankrupt Daewoo group
demonstrated in solidarity with their owners against the possible takeover of their
subsidiary by US giant General Motors.
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to global systemic changes and can be understoodwhen the cumulative
divergences in political and economic practices over nearly three
decades are taken into account.
There is an argument that neo-liberal democracy needs an effective,
pro-active state capable of enforcing competition and correcting the
deep social contradictions inherent to the system. In Latin America,
the historical failures of statism, the power of transnationalized
interests and the seriousness of the ‘fiscal crisis’ have prevented the
state from fulfilling such a role. Instead, the Latin American state uses
its coercive force to prevent social discontent from encroaching onto
the private domains of the privileged.47 Not having been drastically
pared back because of fiscal crisis, the Northeast Asian state has
remained relatively intact and effective. The background of economic
success means that there has been no upsurge of neo-liberal populism
against discredited statism on the Latin American and Eastern
European patterns. By contrast, mass and elite expectations that the
state should correct economic and social ills remain firmly established
in Northeast Asia. This has left more scope for the introduction of
social measures that lessen the pain of labour market reform and for
the promotion of labour’s political rights.
The alternation of power in recent years has brought to power
governments explicitly committed to developing such a hybrid
approach in the name of ‘democratic market economy’ (Korea) or
‘third way’ (Taiwan). Having never been committed to socialism
or statist-populism, Korea’s Kim Dae-Jung and Taiwan’s DPP did
not face the problems of internal party management encountered
by traditionally pro-statist parties elsewhere making the conversion
to market economics.48 Strong doubts persist about the viability of
this pathway of adaptation to neo-liberal globalization. These include
47 Peter B. Evans, ‘The Eclipse of the State?’,World Politics, 50, 1 (1997), pp. 62–87,
at pp. 85–6; Guillermo O’Donnell, ‘Poverty and Inequality in Latin America: Some
Political Reflections’, in Victor E. Tokman and Guillermo O’Donnell, eds, Poverty and
Inequality in Latin America: Issues and New Challenges (Notre Dame: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1990), pp. 49–71, at p. 59.
48 e.g. Edward L. Gibson, ‘The Populist Road to Market Reform: Policy and
Electoral Coalitions in Mexico and Argentina’, World Politics, 49, 3 (1997), pp.
339–70; Mick Moore, (1997) ‘Leading the Left to the Right: Populist Coalitions
and Economic Reform’, World Development, 25, 7 (1997), pp. 1009–28; Kay Burgess,
(2000) ‘Loyalty Dilemmas and Market Reform: Party-Union Alliances Under Stress
in Mexico, Spain, and Venezuela’, World Politics, 52 (2000), pp. 105–34; Victoria
Murillo, ‘From Populism to Neo-Liberalism: Labour Unions and Market Reform in
Latin America’, World Politics, 52 (2000), pp. 135–74.
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doubts about the coherence of ‘democratic market economy’ and
‘third way’ type blueprints that were first developed as part of catch-
all strategies of oppositional mobilization, about the capacity of the
democratic state to act as a balancer of contending interests that is
capable of maintaining autonomy from big business, and the readiness
of transnational investors to be ‘incorporated’ in anyway. Timewill tell
whether these doubts are justified but what is clear from our analysis
of labour is that there are tentative makings of a ‘Northeast Asian
pathway’ of adaptation to the latest round of global systemic change.
